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Libel and the Reporting of Rumor
On October 5, 1981, the Washington Post reported a rumor that Presi-
dent Jimmy Carter had bugged the Washington residence of President-
elect Ronald Reagan during Reagan's preinauguration stay. ' A furor
quickly ensued. President Carter threatened to sue the Post for libel,
2
dropping the threat only after its publisher apologized two weeks later.
3
The Post was harshly criticized for publishing what it admitted was ru-
mor,4 and the criticism increased when the newspaper acknowledged in an
1. The report appeared in a gossip column called "The Ear," which the Post published three
times a week. The report read in full:
Y'ALL COME. . . Well. Quite a little ripple among White Housers new and old. That tired
old tale about Nancy dying for the Carters to blow out of the White House as swiftly as
possible is doing a re-run-with a hot new twist. (Remember the uproar? Nancy supposedly
moaned that she wished Rosalynn and Jimmy would skip out before the Inauguration, so she
could pitch into her decor chores.) Now, word's around among Rosalynn's close pals, about
exactly why the Carters were so sure Nancy wanted them Out. They're saying that Blair
House, where Nancy was lodging-and chatting up First Decorator Ted Graber-was
bugged. And at least one tattler in the Carter tribe has described listening in to the Tape Itself.
Now, the whole story's been carried back to the present White House inhabitants, by another
tattler. Ear is absolutely appalled. Stay tuned, uh, whoever's listening.
The Ear, Wash. Post, Oct. 5, 1981, at D1, col. 1.
2. Wash. Post, Oct. 9, 1981, at A3, col. 1. President Carter demanded that the Post retract the
item and apologize for publishing it. The Post initially responded that it stood behind the report. See
id., Nov. 12, 1981, at A4, col. 1.
3. Wash. Post, Oct. 23, 1981, at Al, col. 5. The apology came in the form of a letter from Donald
E. Graham, publisher of the newspaper, to both President Carter and his wife, Rosalynn. President
Carter dropped his plans to file suit the next day. Id., Oct. 25, 1981, at A7, col. 2.
4. The Post did not report that President Carter had bugged Blair House; it reported that a story
was circulating in Washington that the bugging had taken place. Id., Oct. 5, 1981, at DI, col. 1
("[Wiord's around among Rosalynn's close pals . . . ."). In an editorial prompted by President
Carter's complaint, the Post drew a distinction between reporting information as rumor and reporting
information as fact:
The point was that a story was drculadng .
It is one thing, however, to read that item to say that such a tale is circulating and being
given currency by estimable public figures who repeat it-and quite another to conclude from
this that the place was in fact bugged and that the Carters did in fact perpetrate such a
scheme.
F.Y.I., Wash. Post, Oct. 14, 1981, at A24, col. 1.
Several prominent journalists were critical of the gossip column and the printing of rumors. Syndi-
cated columnist George F. Will, whose work appears in the Post, said: 'The presence of a gossip
column on a great paper. . . is inconsistent with the mission and dignity of the Washington Post."'
Griffith, Going Eyeball to Eyeball-and Blinking, TIME, Nov. 2, 1981, at 122. Thomas Griffith, the
media commentator for Time, questioned the journalistic ethics of gossip columnists: "Gossip writing
requires snoopy eavesdropping, a delight in malice and a readiness to go into print with one side, or
one piece of a story." Id. President Carter's former press secretary, Jody Powell, suggested that the
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editorial that it had printed the item while not believing it to be true.5
Almost lost in the discussion of journalistic ethics was a perplexing le-
gal question: To what extent does the First Amendment protect a
newpaper that publishes rumor, especially rumor that the newspaper does
not believe to be true?6 This Note explores the law of libel as it applies to
publications based on rumor and other unorthodox sources. Part I of the
Note discusses the rationale for publishing reports of rumors. Part II ex-
amines the liability the publisher of rumor may incur under current libel
law. It concludes that current libel law offers inadequate protection for
the publisher. Part III develops a standard of liability for publishing ru-
mor that would address this inadequacy.
I. Reporting Rumor
The characteristic that distinguishes rumor from other types of reports
is its lack of a solid factual basis.7 It is this characteristic that has made
the publishing of rumor a controversial practice among journalists;8 a
traditional tenet of their craft has been that they print only the truth.' Yet
rumor should have been investigated more thoroughly and the resulting story, if true, reported on the
Pos's front page. N.Y. Times, Oct. 16, 1981, at A22, col. 1.
5. In concluding its editorial, the Post wrote, "[The column] said there was a rumor around.
There was. Based on everything we know of the Carter instinct and record on this subject, we find
that rumor utterly impossible to believe." F.YL, supra note 4. The implication of this admission was
that if the Post considered a rumor to be of interest to the public, it would report the rumor's exis-
tence regardless of the rumor's truth. Columnist Will charged that this policy gave "your gossip
columnist a license to disseminate lies." Griffith, supra note 4, at 122. In an advertisement, Mobil
Corp. sarcastically saluted the Post "for extending the frontiers of journalism" and suggested that the
Post establish a rating system for its articles to let "the reader know how much credence to attach to a
given story." N.Y. Times, Oct. 29, 1981, at A27, col. 4. Post Publisher Graham backed away from
the editorial's implications in his letter of apology to the Carters, stating that the editorial "did not
intend to suggest that the paper prints rumors which it knows to be false, because that is not the
policy of The Washington Post." Wash. Post, Oct. 23, 1981, at Al, col. 5. An excellent summary of
the episode appeared in N.Y. Times, Nov. 18, 1981, at A24, col. 5.
6. An exception was a thoughtful article in the New York Times which analyzed both the jour-
nalistic and legal questions raised by the episode. N.Y. Times, Oct. 16, 1981, at A22, col. 1.
7. See G. ALLPORT & L. POSTMAN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RUMOR at ix (1947) (defining rumor as
"specific (or topical) proposition or belief, passed along from person to person, usually by word of
mouth, without secure standards of evidence being present"); T. KNOPF, RUMORS RACE AND RIOT 2
(1975) (central feature of rumor is that it is unverified); R. ROSNOW & G. FINE, RUMOR AND GOSSIP:
THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF HEARSAY 11 (1976) (listing lack of factual basis as one of four charac-
teristics of rumor). Another major characteristic of rumor is that it has no identifiable source but
rather is repeated by many people. See Smith v. Moore, 74 Vt. 81, 86, 52 A. 320, 321 (1902) (rumor
is "a flying or popular report, the common talk . . . not the remarks of a single person").
8. See J. HOHENBERG, THE PROFESSIONAL JOURNALIST 120 (4th ed. 1978) ("The use of rumors
in news stories causes endless trouble, even when the rumors turn out to have some substance."); N.Y.
Times, Oct. 16, 1981, at A22, col. 1 (many news organizations shun use of rumors); supra note 4; see
also L. CANNON, REPORTING: AN INSIDE VIEW 267 (1977) (work of columnist who publishes unsub-
stantiated material said by editor to contain "very wild stuff that we don't publish"); H. GANS, DE-
CIDING WHAT'S NEWS 134 (1979) (publisher of unsubstantial material termed "gossip-monger" by
many journalists). But see L. CANNON, supra, at 267-68 (publisher of rumor necessary "to print a
story when newspapers won't do it on their own"); H. GANS, supra, at 134 (same).
9. See, e.g., COMMISSION ON FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, A FREE AND RESPONSIBLE PRESS 21 (1947)
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a knowledge of rumors often is central to understanding important events.
Rumor can have a significant influence on individual and group behav-
ior:10 Rumors have affected the operation of individual businesses"1 and
the stock market,12 instigated riots,1" and provided the mechanism for po-
litical manipulation.14 Such events fit within any definition of new-
sworthiness,15 and a reporter who wishes to convey the most complete
(media's responsibilities to society include presenting "truthful, comprehensive, and intelligent account
of the day's events in a context which gives them meaning"); J. JOHNSTONE, E. SLAWSKI & W.
BOWMAN, THE NEWS PEOPLE 114 (1976) ("neutral" journalism characterized by strict adherence to
objectivity, factual accuracy, and verification of information); cf id. at 176 (critics of neutral journal-
ism maintain that objectivity is unattainable but still stress fairness and accuracy); Wall St. J., May
14, 1981, at 1, col. I ("New Journalism" proponents adopt freer literary style but still demand accu-
racy). But see G. ALLPORT & L. POSTMAN, supra note 7, at 187 (what press presents as truth may
border on rumor due to inherent problems with process of news reporting).
10. The motivations behind the generation and spread of rumors are complex. A primary factor,
cited by both psychologists and sociologists, is the need to deal with ambiguity on both an individual
and a collective level. For the individual, a rumor satisfies an emotional and intellectual desire to find
a plausible explanation for a confusing situation-the successful rumor justifies why the individual
feels a certain way and gives him a verbal outlet for his anxiety. See G. ALLPORT & L. POSTMAN,
supra note 7, at 37; R. ROSNOW & G. FINE, supra note 7, at 52-54. On a group level, rumor-
mongering has been described as a means of group problem-solving. In order for members of the
group to act in concert when confronted by an unknown situation, the group must develop a common
conception of the problem. This is done by comparing impressions through the spreading of rumors.
Implausible rumors are eliminated as the group builds a consensus. See T. SHIBUTANI, IMPROVISED
NEWS: A SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF RUMOR 163-83 (1966).
11. While stories of impending takeovers, closings, and changes in financial condition are the most
common form of such rumors, this list does not exhaust their variety. See, e.g., Wall St. J., Oct. 10,
1980, at 32, col. 4 (rumors of romantic relationship between head of major corporation and new vice
president led to vice president's resignation); id., May 14, 1980, at 20, col. 2 (Xerox Corp. fights
rumor linking photocopies, cancer); see also id., Feb. 6, 1979, at 1, col. I (describing strategies used by
firms to combat rumors).
12. See Wall St. J., May 15, 1981, at 1, col. 5 (stock speculators circulated rumors of Federal
Reserve chairman's resignation to make profit); id., Sept. 5, 1980, at 17, col. 1 (rumor that presiden-
tial candidate Ronald Reagan suffered heart attack caused plunge in stock prices); id., Apr. 30, 1980,
at 17, col. 1 (small investors ignore brokers' advice for rumors, tips). In the 1920's, journalists some-
times were the instruments of speculators attempting to manipulate stock prices through planted sto-
ries. Newspapermen were reportedly given approximately $100,000 in bribes to print stories as part
of one manipulation scheme. See R. SOBLE, AMEX: A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE,
1921-1971, at 84-86 (1972).
13. Cf T. KNOPF, supra note 7, at 107-67 (rumors help prepare way for riots). For example,
rumors of police brutality were invoked to explain the instigation of the 1965 riot in Watts, a black
residential area of Los Angeles. See R. ROSNOW & G. FINE, supra note 7, at 58.
14. Rumors may play a major role in feuds among government officials: "In the right hands at the
right time, the strategically placed political rumor is perhaps the most subtle and lethal weapon in the
arsenal of the Washington bureaucrat. This kind of rumor is part of the serious maneuvering and
jockeying for power in Washington." N.Y. Times, Nov. 3, 1981, at B10, col. 3; see also Gorman
Towers, Inc. v. Bogoslavsky, 626 F.2d 607 (8th Cir. 1980) (holding privileged defendant's attempt to
influence zoning legislation by spreading false derogatory rumors about proposed apartment complex);
Wall St. J., Nov. 6, 1981, at 34, col. 3 (discussing use of rumors in battle between Secretary of State
Alexander Haig and White House officials).
15. There is no standard definition of newsworthiness, but most definitions stress the number of
people interested in or affected by the event in question. According to the Commission on Freedom of
the Press, journalists use "news" to mean "something that has happened within the last few hours
which will attract the interest of the customers. The criteria of interest are recency or firstness, prox-
imity, combat, human interest, and novelty." COMMISSION ON FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, supra note 9,
at 54-55; see also L. CANNON, supra note 8, at 15-25 (discussing factors used by media to select stories
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account of these events therefore must publish rumors.
Because of its uncertain factual basis, however, the publication of ru-
mor entails a variety of risks. Printing unsubstantiated information may
unjustly injure an individual's reputation."' On a broader scale, publish-
ing rumors may engender harmful confusion in times of emergency, 17 or
undermine the operation of valuable institutions."8 A publisher also must
consider whether reporting rumor will endanger his publication's
credibility. 9
To minimize these dangers, a publisher circulating a report based on
rumor should identify it as such. 0 Such attributions serve to inform the
reader about the reliability of the information being reported."1 The
source of a story is a major factor considered by a publisher in judging the
for publication); J. HOHENBERG, supra note 8, at 88 (characterizing news as an accurate, interesting,
and timely report that explains an event).
16. A classic example of this problem occurred during the 1972 presidential election. A syndicated
columnist published a report that Senator Thomas Eagleton of Missouri, the Democratic vice-presi-
dential nominee, had been arrested for drunken and reckless driving in the 1960's. The report was yet
another blow to Eagleton, who had announced several days earlier that he had been hospitalized three
times for treatment of nervous exhaustion and fatigue. The rumor was later shown to be false. The
columnist issued an apology and retraction. See Wash. Post, July 28, 1972, at A12, col. I (Eagleton
denies rumor published by columnist that he had been arrested for drunken and reckless driving);
Cheshire, Anderson on Eagleton: A Charge That Didn't Stand Up, Wash. Post, July 29, 1972, at
A16, col. 3 (news reporter explains why she did not report Eagleton rumor); Wash. Post, Aug. 2,
1972, at A4, col. I (columnist retracts Eagleton story and apologizes for its publication).
17. See E. DANZIG, THE EFFECTS OF A THREATENING RUMOR ON A DISASTER-STRICKEN COM-
MUNITY (1958); 0. LARSEN, RUMORS IN A DISASTER (1954); R. ROSNOW & G. FINE, supra note 7, at
13; Kreps, Research Needs and Policy Issues on Mass Media Disaster Reporting, 1980 COMMITTEE
ON DISASTERS AND THE MASS MEDIA WORKSHOP 35.
18. Rumors of a bank's insolvency, for example, can become self-fulfilling prophecies if a signifi-
cant number of people react by withdrawing their deposits, as occurred during the Depression. R.
HOFSTADTER, W. MILLER & D. AARON, THE UNITED STATES: THE HISTORY OF A REPUBLIC 715
(2d ed. 1967). A person now commits a federal misdemeanor if he
. . . willfully and knowingly makes, circulates, or transmits to another or others any statement
or rumor, written, printed or by word of mouth, which is untrue in fact and is directly or by
inference derogatory to the financial condition or affects the solvency or financial standing of
the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation ....
18 U.S.C. § 1009 (1976); see also N.Y. Stock Exchange Rule 435(5), 2 N.Y.S.E. GUIDE (CCH)
2435 (forbidding circulation of sensational rumors that might reasonably be expected to affect market
conditions on Exchange); Am. Stock Exchange Rule 3(c), 2 AM. STOCK EX. GUIDE (CCH) 1 9223, at
2417 (same). But see Wall St. J., Feb. 6, 1979, at 1, col. I (N.Y.S.E. rule rarely invoked because of
difficulties in determining who starts or spreads rumors). Not all institutions, of course, can claim the
need for such protection from rumor. See Barrett v. Thomas, 649 F.2d 1193 (5th Cir. 1981) (uphold-
ing lower court decision striking down for overbreadth sheriff's office regulation prohibiting "gossip-
ing" about department members or affairs).
19. A reputation for accuracy is essential if a reporter is to convince reluctant sources that he can
be trusted with sensitive information. In addition, a reporter or newspaper that abuses its use of
unorthodox sources will lose the trust of its readers.
20. The identification within a story of the source of information is termed an "attribution."
Attributed information is a large part of reported news. See B. ROSHCO, NEWSMAKING 63 (1975)
(while attendance at newsworthy events is preferred, most news is gathered through informants); see
also Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279, 285 (1971) ("[A) vast amount of what is published in the daily
and periodical press purports to be descriptive of what somebody said rather than of what anybody
did.").
21. See J. HOHENBERG, supra note 8, at 104.
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story's truth and thereby its newsworthiness. Including the source in the
story is the most effective way of communicating that judgment to the
reader. For example, a reader is more likely to believe a report of an
impending epidemic if it is issued by a government health agency than if
it is gleaned from a rumor mill.
An attribution, however, can do more than lend credence to news-
worthy information; the attribution may be newsworthy itself. Just as an
attribution may reveal something about the veracity of the report, the re-
port may reveal something about the source to which the report is attrib-
uted. Mudslinging during a political campaign is an obvious example of
this second function of attribution. The charges by themselves would not
be newsworthy if they were known to be false, since they would tell the
reader nothing of value about the person being attacked. But the publica-
tion of the statement, coupled with its source, provides the reader with
valuable information about the candidate making the charge, the cam-
paign, and campaigning in general.22 Similarly, the fact that a rumor is
circulating among a certain group reveals information about the
group-the pressures being brought to bear on this group and how the
group may respond. In the extreme case, trivial or even false information
may be newsworthy because of the way it reflects on who said it or where
it was said.2"
The effectiveness of an attribution in either of these roles depends upon
the specificity with which the source is described. While the label rumor
itself is effective in conveying information to the reader, specificity in
describing the group within which a rumor is circulating can increase the
attribution's value. The reader's evaluation of the rumor may differ de-
pending upon the education, position, and influence of those spreading the
rumor.
22. Note, however, that the value of the statement can be communicated to the reader only if he is
informed of the statement's falsity.
23. The press coverage of the President provides a case in point. As a press secretary to President
Lyndon B. Johnson wrote:
There is no other official of the government who can make a top headline story merely by
releasing a routine list of his daily activities. There is no other official of the government who
can be certain of universal newspaper play by merely releasing a picture of a quiet dinner
with boyhood friends. There is no other official who can attract public attention merely by
granting an interview consisting of reflections, no matter how banal or mundane, on social
trends in fields where he has no expertise and in which his concepts are totally irrelevant to his
function as a public servant.
G. REEDY, THE TWILIGHT OF THE PRESIDENCY 101 (1970).
While this second function of attribution no doubt helps the President by keeping him in the public
eye, it can hurt him, too. Through both the style and substance of their answers at press conferences,
Presidents Harry S Truman and Dwight D. Eisenhower created images in the minds of the public.
for Truman, one of arrogance and obstinacy; for Eisenhower, one of irresolution. See D. CATER, THE
FOURTH BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT 42 (1959).
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II. Libel Law, Rumor, and Republished Speech
Under traditional common-law doctrine, the publisher of a defamatory
rumor incurred a high risk of liability. Following the constitutionalization
of much of libel law in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan24 and Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 5 the risk was lessened but is still considerable. The
new rules of libel are more generous than those they replaced, but they
still fail to provide adequate protection to the publisher of rumor.
A. Common-Law Libel and Rumor Before Sullivan
Before 1964, the publication of defamatory rumor would in most cases
provide the basis for a successful libel suit. The common-law claim of
libel was easy to establish; many jurisdictions required only a showing of
the defamatory nature"8 of the material and the fact of its publication.
7 If
the publisher was not protected by a privilege,28 his only defense in many
jurisdictions was to prove the truth of his publication.29 This was a diffi-
24. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
25. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
26. A defamatory communication typically is defined as one that tends to hold the plaintiff up to
hatred, contempt, or ridicule, to cause him to be shunned or avoided, or, more generally, as one that
injures reputation. See Brown v. News-World Publishing Corp., 245 So. 2d 430, 432 (La. Ct. App.
1971); Stone v. Essex County Newspapers, Inc., 367 Mass. 849, 853, 330 N.E.2d 161, 165 (1975);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1976).
27. Holden v. American News Co., 52 F. Supp. 24 (E.D. Wash. 1943), appeal dismissed, 144
F.2d 249 (9th Cir. 1944); Ripps v. Herrington, 241 Ala. 209, 212, 1 So. 2d 899, 902 (1941); RE-
STATEMENT OF TORTS § 558 (1938).
28. As an alternative to the defense of truth, both the pre- and post-Sullivan publishers of rumor
could raise the defense of conditional privilege. In its most common form, the conditional privilege
protects any fair and accurate report of defamatory statements made in connection with the operation
of government. See infra note 62. Outside of the governmental context, the common law recognizes a
privilege to report rumor, even if known to be false, if legal duty or social obligation requires such
action. See, e.g., Hogan v. New York Times Co., 211 F. Supp 99, 111 n.24 (D. Conn. 1962) (dictum)
(suggesting that publication of rumor by newspaper would be protected by privilege to publish rumor
in limited circumstances), afl'd, 313 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1963); Stukuls v. State, 42 N.Y.2d 272, 278-
83, 366 N.E.2d 829, 833-35, 397 N.Y.S.2d 740, 744-46 (1977) (applying conditional privilege to
report of rumor in defamation action between employer and employee); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 602 (1976) (recognizing privilege for publishing defamatory rumor). Cf Bocchicchio v. Cur-
tis Publishing Co., 203 F. Supp. 403, 412 (E.D. Pa. 1962) (upholding jury charge that "a publisher
may have a privilege to publish, for a relatively large segment of the public, material which an indi-
vidual, who is not a publisher, may not have a privilege to say because no public policy would justify
such individual gossip"). But cf Lundin v. Post Publishing Co., 217 Mass. 213, 215, 104 N.E. 480,
481 (1914) (newspaper publishers have no greater rights to give currency to false charges than other
persons).
29. See, e.g., Holden v. American News Co., 52 F. Supp. 24, 32 (E.D. Wash. 1943), appeal
dismissed, 144 F.2d 249 (9th Cir. 1944); Ripps v. Herrington, 214 Ala. 209, 212, 1 So. 2d 899, 902
(1941); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 116, at 796-99 (1971). The common law
did not allow a publisher to advance the defense that reasonable care had been used in preparing the
report. The rules governing libel were, in effect, those of strict liability. Peck v. Tribune Co., 214 U.S.
185, 189 (1909); Sorensen v. Wood, 123 Neb. 348, 356-57, 243 N.W. 82, 86 (1932), appeal dismissed
sub nom. KFAB Broadcasting Co. v. Sorensen, 290 U.S. 599 (1933) (per curiam). But see New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 n.20 (1964) (listing states with standards of liability more
lenient toward publisher).
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cult burden to bear in suits based on news stories using standard
sources;30 it was often impossible when the report was drawn from rumor,
since the essential characteristic of a rumor is its uncertain factual basis.
Given these rules, a publisher might have been tempted to ease his bur-
den of proof by explicitly attributing the defamatory information in the
news story to rumor. Logically, the publisher could then advance a suc-
cessful defense merely by proving that the rumor existed, rather than by
proving that the rumor was true. But the common law barred the libel
defendant from using this strategy by holding that the publisher of a de-
famatory statement adopted the statement as his own and incurred the
same liability as if he were the original speaker. 1 Even if the publisher
included in his report information contradicting the rumor, the law held
him liable. "
B. Rumor and the Sullivan-Gertz Standard
Much of the common law of libel has been supplanted by the line of
Supreme Court cases that began with New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,3
a libel action brought by the police commissioner of Montgomery, Ala-
bama. 4 In Sullivan, the Court identified the core of speech protected by
the First Amendment as expression upon public issues. 5 In addition, the
30. The burden was heavy because courts at one time required defendants to prove that their
defamatory publications were literally true. See W. PROSSER, supra note 29, §116, at 798. Modern
decisions require that defendants show that the defamatory material is substantially true. Emde v. San
Joaquin County Cent. Labor Council, 23 Cal. 2d 146, 160, 143 P.2d 20, 28 (1943); Kilian v.
Doubleday & Co., 367 Pa. 117, 123, 79 A.2d 657, 660 (1951); W. PROSSER, supra note 29, § 116, at
798.
31. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Robinson, 233 Ark. 168, 172-73, 345 S.W.2d 34, 37 (1961)
(defendant must prove truth of substance of rumor even though report included disclaimer "it is
currently reported"); Cobbs v. Chicago Defender, 308 Ill. App. 55, 59, 31 N.E.2d 323, 325 (1941)
(attribution to rumor does not relieve publisher of liability for report); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §
578 (1938) (republisher of defamatory statement subject to liability as if had originally published
statement); cf. Hope v. Hearst Consol. Publications, 294 F.2d 681 (2d Cir. 1961) (upholding jury
award in libel suit based on gossip column item that began "Palm Beach is buzzing with the story
.. "), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 956 (1962); Thackrey v. Patterson, 157 F.2d 614 (D.C. Cir. 1946)
(reversing dismissal of complaint in libel suit based on article reporting "conjectures" and "saucy little
rumors" about plaintiffs). The attribution could be cited as a factor toward mitigating damages, how-
ever. See Bishop v. Journal Newspaper Co., 168 Mass. 327, 47 N.E. 119 (1897). The common law
put the publisher in the shoes of the original speaker because of the substantial additional injury
caused by the publication. See Venn v. Tennessean Newspapers, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 47, 57 (M.D.
Tenn. 1962), afld mem., 313 F.2d 639 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 830 (1963).
32. See Bishop v. Journal Newspaper Co., 168 Mass. 327, 47 N.E. 119 (1897); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS, § 548 comment e (1976).
33. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
34. The commissioner's suit was based on an advertisement in the New York Times criticizing
the treatment of Southern civil rights activists. The Supreme Court overturned a $500,000 judgment
awarded by an Alabama jury to the commissioner. 376 U.S. at 256.
35. 376 U.S. at 269. At another point, the Court rephrased this principle by stating that "debate
on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open." Id. at 270. The Court repeatedly
emphasized the importance to the democratic process that no individual be restrained from adding his
voice to the public debate. The importance of such freedom of access is based on the assumption that
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Court considered the strategic question of where the specific line of pro-
tection around this core speech should be drawn."6 It concluded that bene-
ficial debate on public issues would reach its optimal level if freedom from
liability were widened to embrace not only statements that could be
proven true but also "erroneous statements honestly made." ' To achieve
what it decided was an appropriate level of protection, the Court estab-
lished the "actual malice"38 test of liability. Under that test, a public offi-
cial could recover in a libel action only if he showed that "the [defama-
tory] statement was made . . . with knowledge that it was false or with
reckless disregard of whether it was false or not."39
The decision in Sullivan used as its starting point the issue of seditious
libel.4 In the cases following Sullivan, as the Court debated how much
more broadly actual malice protection should sweep, the argument was
recast more generally as one weighing the state's interest in compensating
the democratic process will reach proper results only if rival ideas are allowed to compete. Id. In
addition, such access allows the individual to participate fully in the democratic process, thereby pro-
moting his sense of fulfillment and worth. It is assumed that government will be more stable in such a
system. Id. at 269-70; see also Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV.
245, 255 (First Amendment protects activities of thought and communication by which citizens "gov-
ern"); Brennan, The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First Amendment, 79
HARV. L. REV. 1 (1965) (discussing relevance of Meiklejohn theory to Sullivan analysis); Kalven,
The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning of the First Amendment," 1964 SUP.
CT. REV. 191, 207-13, 221 (same).
36. The Court held that Alabama's libel law drew the line around permissible public debate too
tightly. By allowing a public official to establish libel through a simple showing of defamatory effect,
the Alabama law failed to acknowledge that the hallmark of effective criticism is in fact its impact in
injuring an official's reputation. By providing the defendant newspaper with only the defense of truth,
the law failed to recognize the inevitability of factual error in free debate. 376 U.S. at 271-73.
37. Id. at 278. This analysis usually is summarized as an attempt to see if the rule of liability
creates adequate .'breathing space'" for the desired speech. Id. at 272 (quoting NAACP v. Button,
371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)). While the major contribution to public debate comes from a speaker who
speaks the truth, the Court was willing to protect some false speech so that criticism believed to be
true and in fact true might not be discouraged by fear of liability. The Court's interest in protecting
false speech lay only in its value as a buffer for true speech. Id. at 279. False speech itself, whether
intentional or careless, has been held to have no inherent constitutional value. Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974); St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 732 (1968).
38. "Actual malice" was an unfortunate choice of words, as it could potentially be confused with
"malice" in common law libel, which means ill will or spite. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418
U.S. 323, 334, n.6 (1974); Beckley Newspapers Corp. v. Hanks, 389 U.S. 81 (1967) (per curiam).
39. 376 U.S. at 279-80. Reckless disregard was later explained to mean that the defendant must
have "entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication." St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S.
727, 731 (1968). The Sullivan Court also rejected the preponderance of the evidence standard for libel
cases; instead, the plaintiff had to show actual malice with "convincing clarity." 376 U.S. at 285-86.
Knowledge of falsity and the possession of serious doubts as to truth are both subjective standards
based on the state of mind of the publisher. Obviously the defendant is best qualified to render evi-
dence as to his own state of mind. But the defendant's profession of belief is not necessarily dispositive.
Subsequent cases have focused on objective evidence that may prove or disprove the required state of
mind. See St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968) (reviewing development of actual malice
standard).
40. The Court asserted that the commitment to uninhibited debate on public issues recognized in
Sullivan was initially formulated during the controversy over the Sedition Act of 1798. 376 U.S. at
273. At its narrowest, Sullivan can be read as establishing the unconstitutionality of seditious libel
laws.
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the victims of libel against the First Amendment interest in promoting the
public debate. 1 It was not until nine years after Sullivan that a stable
majority position emerged in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.4 2 The Court in
Gertz held that the status of the plaintiff was the critical factor in striking
the appropriate balance. The Court asserted that plaintiffs who are public
officials or public figures43 have access to the media and can mitigate the
defamation's effect through their own efforts, and that they assume a
greater risk of injury from defamation through their involvement in public
life. Such plaintiffs, therefore, need only the limited protection of actual
malice. Private individuals, in contrast, have little opportunity for self-
help and do not seek publicity; therefore, the Court held that requiring
them to prove actual malice would unduly infringe upon the state's inter-
41. The first explicit disagreement over the relative weight to be given reputational interests oc-
curred in Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966). The plaintiff was the former supervisor of a county
recreation area who claimed to have been libeled by a newspaper column criticizing his management
of finances; at issue was whether he fell within the Sullivan definition of public official. The majority
noted that there was a strong interest in debate on "public issues" and in debate about those persons
in a position to influence the resolution of those issues. This interest overcame society's "pervasive and
strong interest in preventing and redressing attacks upon reputation." The Court therefore held that
the actual malice standard applied. Id. at 85-86. In a concurring opinion, Justice Stewart urged a
much narrower approach, arguing that constitutional libel law should continue to focus on seditious
libel. Id. at 91-92 (Stewart, J., concurring).
Justice Harlan took up the idea that actual malice should be limited to seditious libel cases in
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967). Harlan asserted that the interest in reputation of
a private individual who was prominent or involved in the public debate dictated a negligence stan-
dard of liability that, though demanding, fell below the rigor of actual malice. Id. at 154-55. Chief
Justice Warren, in a concurring opinion that is treated as controlling, rejected Harlan's negligence test
as an "unusual and uncertain formulation" and stated that public figures must show actual malice. Id.
at 163-64 (Warren, C.J., concurring). A plurality in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29
(1971) then shifted the focus of actual malice protection from the status of the plaintiff to the subject
matter at issue. Actual malice was held to apply to any libel action involving an event of public or
general concern. The plurality noted the "important interests" of an individual's public reputation
and good name that are protected by state libel law but held that they were outweighed by the needs
of freedom of the press and speech. Id. at 49-50. The dissenters attacked the plurality position for
insufficiently protecting individuals who had not voluntarily placed themselves in the public light and
for creating a judicially unmanageable standard of liability. Id. at 62 (Harlan, J., dissenting); id. at 78
(Marshall, J., dissenting). The dissenters' position prevailed three years later, when the Court re-
turned the focus of libel law to the plaintiff's status in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323
(1974).
42. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
43. Gertz hypothesized two types of public figures: an individual who is so well-known that he
becomes a "public figure for all purposes" and an individual who is a "public figure for a limited
range of issues." The latter type is further divided into two categories: the individual who voluntarily
injects himself into a public controversy and the individual who is involuntarily drawn into such a
controversy. Id. at 351.
Cases following Gertz have retained the Gertz dichotomy but have narrowed the classes of plaintiffs
who might qualify as public figures. Several factors may be isolated in the more recent Supreme
Court libel decisions, most or all of which must be present in order to establish that the plaintiff is a
public figure: the existence of a public controversy, see Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 135
(1979); Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 453-54 (1976); the plaintiff's voluntary self-injection
into that controversy, see Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157, 166 (1979); Firestone, 424
U.S. at 454; the extensiveness of plaintiff's participation in the controversy, see Wolston, 443 U.S. at
168; Hutchinson, 443 U.S. at 135-36; and the plaintiff's access to the media, see Hutchinson, 443
U.S. at 136.
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est in compensating them for the harm inflicted by defamatory falsehood.
The Court, however, did not believe that the state interest completely
overrode First Amendment considerations in suits involving private
figures; it also held that the states could not impose liability without a
showing of fault on the part of the publisher."'
Yet even following Sullivan and Gertz, the publisher of rumor faced a
serious threat of liability. In suits brought by private individuals, the pub-
lication of defamatory rumor would be actionable under the Gertz fault
requirement, since injury arising from such a publication would almost
certainly be held to be a result of negligence.45 Nor would this result
change if the report were explicitly attributed to rumor. At first glance,
the addition of the attribution would seem to change the content of the
message being communicated and therefore would alter the factors
weighed in the negligence calculus. Many courts, however, have taken the
position in private-figure cases that the common-law rule holding the pub-
lisher liable as if he were the original speaker survived Gertz. These
courts would judge liability by the same negligence standard that would
apply if the rumor were reported as fact,"" although the qualifying attri-
44. Geriz, 418 U.S. at 347-50. The Court also ruled that punitive damages could not be recovered
by private plaintiffs unless actual malice was shown. Id.
45. Following Gerz, many jurisdictions have adopted negligence as the standard of liability in
libel cases brought by private persons. See, e.g., McCall v. Courier-Journal & Louisville Times Co.,
623 S.W.2d 882, 894 (Ky. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2239 (1982); Memphis Publishing Co. v.
Nichols, 569 S.W.2d 412 (Tenn. 1978); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 580B (1976). One
method of gauging negligence in libel cases is to determine whether the defendant had reasonable
grounds for believing that the communication was true. See Taskett v. King Broadcasting Co., 86
Wash. 2d 439, 445, 546 P.2d 81, 85 (1976); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 580B comment g
(1976). Since rumor by definition lacks a solid factual basis, the publisher who prints rumor with no
substantiating information would probably be found to have acted unreasonably. Negligence also is
judged according to the customs and practices of the profession. See Gobin v. Globe Publishing Co.,
216 Kan. 223, 233, 531 P.2d 76, 84 (1975); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 580B comment g
(1976). Journalists as a profession disapprove of printing rumors. The negligence standard also con-
siders the interests the defendant was seeking to promote by publishing the defamatory matter. "In-
forming the public as to a matter of public concern is an important interest in a democracy; spreading
of mere gossip is of less importance." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 580B comment h (1976).
46. The Tenth Circuit took this position in Dixson v. Newsweek, Inc., 562 F.2d 626 (10th Cir.
1977). Dixson, a former vice-president of Frontier Airlines, won a libel verdict against Newsweek
based on a story that discussed his discharge from the financially troubled company. In affirming the
verdict, the circuit court rejected Newsweek's defense that its story had accurately reported the state-
ments of other Frontier executives. The court said the jury finding to the contrary was supported by
the record and added that "[b]e that as it may, the republication of false defamatory statements is as
much a tort as the original publication." Id. at 630-31. The court had earlier noted that Gertz forbade
only strict liability in cases involving private individuals; "[w]ithin the stated limitations, a state is free
to act." Id. at 629. Presumably, this freedom extends to negating the impact on liability of attribu-
tions. Other courts have reached the same conclusion. See Dresbach v. Doubleday & Co., 8 MEDIA L.
REP. (BNA) 1793, 1795 (D.D.C. 1982); Hoover v. Peerless Publications, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 1206,
1209 (E.D. Pa. 1978); McCall v. Courier-Journal & Louisville Times Co., 623 S.W.2d 882, 894
(Ky. 1981) (Lukowsky, J., filing separately), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2239 (1982); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS) § 578 (1976); cf Moran v. Hearst Corp., 40 N.Y.2d 1071, 1072, 360 N.E.2d
932, 932, 392 N.Y.S.2d 253, 254 (1976) (Fuchsberg, J., concurring) ("Even granting defendants'
contention that the article in question made clear that the statements being reported were only 'gos-
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bution might help to mitigate damages."'
In public-figure cases, there is the additional protection of the actual
malice rule. But even if the publisher professed to have a good-faith belief
in the truth of the rumor, the reporting of rumor as fact could still create
liability. The defamed party might prove reckless disregard of the truth by
showing that the publisher failed to investigate the rumor to establish its
veracity. While the Court has held that actual malice is not measured by
whether a reasonably prudent person would have investigated the truth of
his publication,48 it has indicated that certain categories of sources are of
such questionable reliability that a failure to investigate may provide
grounds for finding actual malice.' 9
Explicitly labeling the report as rumor raises more complicated ques-
tions when liability is judged by the actual malice test. A news report
based on attributed information contains two potential sources of falsity:
in the report of what was said and in the original statement itself.
The issue of actual malice as it relates to the accuracy of quotations was
addressed in a straightforward manner by the Supreme Court in Time,
Inc. v. Pape.50 The implication of the ruling, not surprisingly, was that a
publisher acts with actual malice if he knows that his account of a third
party's statement is inaccurate. 51
sip', the tone, style, and arrangement of the 'gossip' was such that the average reader might well be
inclined to conclude that where there is smoke there is fire.").
47. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 578 comment e (1976).
48. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 332 (1974); St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S.
727, 731 (1968); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 287-88 (1964).
49. Examples would be basing the story wholly on an unverified anonymous telephone call, re-
porting allegations so inherently improbable that only a reckless man would put them into circulation,
and using material from an informant despite the existence of obvious reasons to doubt the inform-
ant's veracity or the accuracy of his reports. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 732; see also
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 157 (1967) (publisher knew that source of news story
was on probation but did not investigate accuracy of source's statements); id. at 169 (Warren, C.J.,
concurring) (characterizing investigation of source's veracity as "slipshod and sketchy").
50. 401 U.S. 279 (1971). The case involved a libel claim against Time based on an article describ-
ing a report by the United States Commission on Civil Rights. The report at one point summarized
allegations of police brutality made against Deputy Chief of Detectives Pape and other Chicago police
officers. Time quoted the summary but did not indicate that the events described were allegations
rather than commission findings. Pape filed suit, alleging not that the events described were false but
that Time gave the allegations credibility by falsely presenting them as official findings. Since Time
admitted it had consciously chosen to omit the word "alleged," thus satisfying the scienter requirement
of actual malice, the question became whether the article was a falsification of the report. The Court
held that given the ambiguity of the report, Time's interpretation might represent an error in judg-
ment but did not constitute reckless disregard of the truth. Id. at 280-82, 285, 292; see also Greenbelt
Coop. Publishing Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 12-13 (1970) (dictum) (accurate report of city council
meeting did not constitute actual malice); Sowle, Defamation and the First Amendment: The Case for
a Constitutional Privilege of Fair Report, 54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 469, 501-08 (1979) (describing plain-
tiff's and defendant's litigation strategies in Pape).
51. Some courts have read Pape as creating a privilege that would protect the publisher's accurate
publication of another party's statements, even if the publisher knew the statements to be false. See,
e.g., Edwards v. National Audubon Soc'y, 556 F.2d 113, 120 (2d Cir.), cmrt. denied, 434 U.S. 1002
(1977); Novel v. Garrison, 338 F. Supp. 977, 982-83 (N.D. I1. 1971). This interpretation reads too
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The more interesting question is posed by the second source of falsity.
The Supreme Court has not directly faced the issue of whether a pub-
lisher acts with actual malice by publishing statements that, while accu-
rately attributed, he knows or suspects to be false. But two pre-Gertz52
opinions suggest that this may be the case. The first, St. Amant v.
Thompson,5" involved a candidate for public office who, during a televised
speech, read a statement made by a local union member that defamed the
parish deputy sheriff. The sheriff sued the candidate for libel and won.
The candidate claimed at trial and on appeal that, because his statements
were quoted from another speaker, he could not be held responsible for
their underlying falsity. The Supreme Court reversed the Louisiana court
on the ground that there was insufficient evidence to show that the candi-
date acted with reckless disregard for the truth. But it did agree that the
defendant's claim of immunity was unfounded, and it did not cite the at-
tribution as a relevant factor in its finding of insufficient evidence.
54
In the second case, Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Association v.
Bresler,55 the majority did not reach the attribution issue, but Justice
White addressed it in his concurrence. The respondent in Greenbelt was a
local real estate developer and builder whose offer to sell land to the city
in return for certain zoning variances had been characterized as "black-
mail" at several city council meetings. The local newspaper reported the
controversy, including the blackmail charges. The developer sued the
newspaper for libel, claiming that the report charged him with committing
a crime, and won. The Supreme Court reversed the decision, holding that
the charge of blackmail, when viewed in the context of the city council
meeting, was rhetorical hyperbole, not an accusation of criminal conduct,
and therefore was not libelous.5" But Justice White's concurrence noted
that if the charge had been libelous, the newspaper, which admitted it
knew such an accusation to be false, would have published with actual
malice.57
much into Pape, however, since the accuracy of the Commission's report was not at issue. See Cianci
v. New Times Publishing Co., 639 F.2d 54, 67 n.15 (2d Cir. 1980); Sowle, supra note 50, at 501-08.
52. The Gertz reformulation of libel law does not alter the inferences to be drawn from these
cases. The issue in Gertz was the breadth with which the actual malice standard should be applied;
the elements of the test itself were left unchanged.
53. 390 U.S. 727 (1968). Sullivan also implicitly raised the issue of republished speech, since the
basis of the suit was an advertisement.
54. Id. at 730-33.
55. 398 U.S. 6 (1970).
56. Id. at 14.
57. Id. at 23 (White, J., concurring). Justice White's analysis was based upon whether the news-
paper's report could be interpreted as charging the plaintiff with the commission of a crime. The
Court had found, however, that the report was an accurate account of the events at the meeting. Id. at
12-13. Thus, Justice White would have held the newspaper liable, even though its report was accu-
rate. Other courts support Justice White's approach in applying actual malice. See, e.g., Cianci v.
New Times Publishing Co., 639 F.2d 54, 60-61 (2d Cir. 1980) (publisher incurs liability under
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The conclusion to be drawn from the cases is that a newspaper that
publishes defamatory rumor, or any third party's defamatory statement
that the publisher knew or should have known to be false, incurs a serious
risk of liability."' Courts have reached this strict result by adopting a view
of actual malice that focuses only on the falsity of the defamatory state-
ment itself and ignores the inclusion of an attribution and other informa-
tion revealing the statement's questionable validity. This narrow approach
makes sense when the only purpose of the attribution is to communicate
the truth of the statement being reported. The statement's value to the
reader rests upon its truth, and if the publisher knows or should suspect
that the statement is false, he should be discouraged from publishing it.
The courts effectively achieve this result by holding that the publisher
adopts the original speaker's statement as his own and therefore is liable if
he is aware of the statement's falsity. A narrow approach is inadequate,
however, when the attribution to rumor reveals something about the char-
acter of the source or the event from which it arises. 9 In these cases, the
falsity of the material does not destroy the report's value but only affects
the message the report conveys. By putting the publisher in the original
speaker's shoes, the actual malice test discourages him from reporting this
valuable but false speech and thus prevents him from presenting a full
account of newsworthy events.
actual malice standard if he knew of falsity, regardless of attribution); Dickey v. CBS Inc., 583 F.2d
1221, 1226 (3d Cir. 1978) (rejecting argument that "false statements by a third party which have
been published by the press, are entitled to a unique constitutional analysis"); Edwards v. National
Audubon Soc'y, 556 F.2d 113, 119 (2d Cir.) (newspaper reporter could be found to have acted with
actual malice if he had serious doubts about truth of defamatory allegations, even if he did not have
any doubts that he was reporting them faithfully), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1002 (1977); Goldwater v.
Ginzburg, 414 F.2d 324, 337 (2d Cir. 1969) (repetition of another's words does not release one of
responsibility if repeater knows that words are false, inherently improbable, or there are obvious
reasons to doubt veracity of person quoted or accuracy of his reports) (citing St. Amant v. Thompson,
390 U.S. 727, 732 (1968)), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1049 (1970); Catalano v. Pechous, 83 Ill. 2d 146,
168, 419 N.E.2d 350, 361 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 911 (1981). Other courts have been reluctant
to apply actual malice strictly in cases involving the publication of defamatory statements originating
with other speakers. See Medina v. Time, Inc., 439 F.2d 1129, 1130 (1st Cir. 1971); Oliver v. Village
Voice, Inc., 417 F. Supp. 235, 238 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Novel v. Garrison, 338 F. Supp. 977, 982-83
(N.D. Ill. 1971).
Not only did the newspaper article in Greenbelt accurately report the statements made at the coun-
cil meeting, it also presented both sides of the discussion. Thus, Justice White's position is particularly
unsettling in light of the evenhanded treatment given the controversy. Cf. Airlie Found. v. Evening
Star Newspaper Co., 337 F. Supp. 421 (D.D.C. 1972) (upholding jury finding of knowing or reckless
falsity despite publication of denials).
58. An empirical study of libel cases has shown that the press loses a greater percentage of libel
suits when it reports the public comments of others than when it reports its own stories. Franklin,
Winners and Losers and Why: A Study of Defamation Litigation, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J.
457, 489.
59. See supra p. 89; c. Robertson, Defamation and the First Amendment: In Praise of Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 54 TEX. L. REV. 199, 266 (1976) (where making of charge is newsworthy event,
newpaper that publishes charge with source should not be interpreted as impliedly supporting veracity
of charge).
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III. Rumor and the Constitutional Privilege to Report the Statements of
Others
The special treatment required by republished speech has been ad-
dressed by the Second Circuit, which in Edwards v. National Audubon
Society"0 adopted a constitutional privilege protecting such publications in
limited circumstances. Any attempt to devise a libel standard for rumor
should begin with Edwards. While Edwards represents a significant step
toward resolving the shortcomings of the Sullivan-Gertz line of cases, its
scope is too narrow, and it is not designed to address the special concerns
raised by reports based on rumor and other unorthodox sources. The Note
discusses how the privilege could be modified to do so.
A. Establishing the Republication Privilege
The Second Circuit, recognizing the value of republishing certain false
speech, created in Edwards a constitutional privilege to publish another's
statements "regardless of the reporter's private views regarding their va-
lidity." ' A jury had found the New York Times guilty of libel after it
printed allegations by the National Audubon Society that five scientists
who supported the continued use of the pesticide DDT were "paid liars"
for the pesticide industry. The Second Circuit reversed the verdict against
the Times, holding that the plaintiffs had not established actual malice,
and that, even if actual malice had been shown, the reporter would have
possessed a constitutional privilege to publish the charges.6 2 The privilege,
60. 556 F.2d 113 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1002 (1977).
61. Id. at 120. Edwards has been discussed in Sowle, supra note 50, at 527-28; Note, Protecting
the Public Debate: A Proposed Constitutional Privilege of Accurate Republication, 58 TEX. L. REV.
623, 638-40 (1980); Comment, Constitutional Privilege to Republish Defamation, 77 COLUM. L.
REV. 1266 (1977); Comment, Restricting the First Amendment Right to Republish Defamatory State-
ments, 69 GEO. L.J. 1495 (1981); Comment, Edwards v. Nat'l Audubon Soe'y, Inc.: The Right to
Print Known Falsehoods, 1979 U. ILL. L.F. 943; Comment, The Privilege of Neutral Report-
age-Edwards v. National Audubon Society, Inc., 1978 UTAH L. REV. 349.
62. 556 F.2d at 120. The court called this privilege the "right of neutral reportage." Id. The
Edwards constitutional privilege finds its roots in the common-law privileges of republication. These
privileges constitute an important set of exceptions to the common-law rule that the republisher of a
defamatory statement incurs the same liability as if he had originated the statement. See supra p. 91.
The privileges primarily cover the reporting of statements made in connection with the operation of
government. If the report of a statement falls within the privilege, the publisher cannot be held liable
if the report was a fair and accurate account of what occurred. See Medico v. Time, Inc., 509 F.
Supp. 268, 272 (E.D. Pa. 1980), afFd, 643 F.2d 134 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 836 (1981);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 611 (1976). The common-law privileges may protect the pub-
lisher even if he knows that the statement is false. See, e.g., Hurley v. Northwest Publications, Inc.,
273 F. Supp. 967, 975 (D. Minn. 1967), afld, 398 F.2d 346 (8th Cir. 1968); RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS § 611 comment a (1976). They may be lost, however, if the plaintiff shows that the
publication was motivated by malice, that is, ill will or spite. See American Dist. Tel. Co. v. Brink's
Inc., 380 F.2d 131, 133 (7th Cir. 1967); Langford v. Vanderbilt Univ., 199 Tenn. 389, 399, 287
S.W.2d 32, 37 (1956), remanded, 44 Tenn. App. 694, 318 S.W.2d 568, cert. denied, 44 Tenn. App.
694, 318 S.W.2d 568 (Tenn. 1958). But see Hill, Defamation and Privacy Under the First Amend-
ment, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 1205, 1249 (1976) (forfeiture of privilege based on ill will may be
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as described by the court, would protect the "accurate and disinterested"
reporting of "newsworthy" charges made by "responsible, prominent"
speakers against public officials or public figures.6" If these criteria are not
met, then liability would be determined under the Sullivan actual malice
rule, and the publisher would be held responsible for knowledge of the
underlying truth or falsity of the defamatory charge.
At first glance, the Edwards standard, because it extends the media's
freedom from liability beyond Gertz, would seem to upset the constitu-
tional balance struck by the Supreme Court between promotion of public
debate and the state's interest in protecting reputation. 4 But the publica-
tion of newsworthy statements of others, even though known to be false,
enhances the public debate in a manner that was not the focus of the
Sullivan-Gertz line of cases.6 5 Therefore, it could be argued that this
tradeoff between promotion of debate and protection of reputation is not
foreclosed by Gertz and may still fall within a constitutionally covered
range.66 Such an argument is strengthened by the limitations imposed by
unconstitutional).
For a discussion of three theoretical bases used by courts to support the common-law privileges of
republication, see Note, Privilege to Republish Defamation, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1102, 1103-16
(1964) (identifying "supervisory," "informational," and "agency" rationales).
63. Edwards, 556 F.2d at 120.
64. Cf. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 455-57 (1976) (extending actual malice protection
to all reports of judicial proceedings would upset balance struck in Gertz).
65. The Sullivan-Gertz line of cases based its reasoning on a democracy's need for strong debate
on public issues and on a concern over the ability of the individual to add his voice to that debate. The
issue in Edwards was different; there, the newspaper was not adding its voice to the debate but raiher
was informing the public about how the debate was proceeding.
66. The Edwards court maintained that the role of the press in circulating newsworthy statements
made by other speakers was constitutionally protected, citing Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279 (1971),
as a source of this constitutional privilege. 556 F.2d at 115, 120, 122. This is a misreading of Pape,
however. See Cianci v. New Times Publishing Co., 639 F.2d 54, 67 & n.15 (2d Cir. 1980); supra
note 50. A better source is New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). Sullivan identifies the
need to promote debate on public issues as the core of the First Amendment. Edwards correctly notes
that by circulating newsworthy statements, the press enhances the individual's ability to participate
intelligently in that debate. 556 F.2d at 115. ("It is elementary that a democracy cannot long survive
unless the people are provided the information needed to form judgments on issues that affect their
ability to intelligently govern themselves."). Other Supreme Court cases also indicate that the need to
protect speech performing this informational function may have constitutional dimensions. See
Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978) (striking down statute imposing
criminal sanctions on publication of truthful information about confidential proceedings of judicial
commission); Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 560 (1976) ("The press does not simply
publish information about trials but guards against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting the ...
judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny. . . .") (citing Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350
(1966)); Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975) (striking down statute imposing liabil-
ity for invasion of privacy based on publication of truthful information obtained from court docu-
ments); Greenbelt Coop. Publishing Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 11 (1970) ("This case involves
newspaper reports of public meetings of the citizens of a community concerned with matters of local
governmental interest and importance. The very subject matter of the news reports, therefore, is one of
particular First Amendment concern."); Hill, supra note 62, at 1219-20; Sowle, supra note 50, at
495-500. But cf. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 455 (1976) (rejecting extension of actual
malice protection to reports of judicial proceedings). The Supreme Court has not recognized a consti-
tutional republication privilege covering suits for defamation, however, and its discussion of the consti-
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the elements of the Edwards test. 7 The restriction of the privilege to suits
brought by public officials and public figures"' incorporates the recogni-
tion in Gertz that the plaintiff's status is a critical factor in balancing the
tutional value of the press's informational role has been limited to the context of governmental
proceedings.
67. Given its recognition of the public-private plaintiff distinction, it is puzzling why Edwards
stressed newsworthiness as a limitation on the privilege. The newsworthiness standard seems super-
fluous, since any charge leveled against a public official or public figure by a responsible, prominent
speaker would be newsworthy. In a subsequent case, the Second Circuit indicated that the Edwards
privilege would protect the accurate reporting of any newsworthy statement, regardless of the status of
the defamed party or of the speaker. Herbert v. Lando, 568 F.2d 974, 980 (2d Cir. 1977) (dictum),
rev'd on other grounds, 441 U.S. 153 (1979). But the court reaffirmed the original Edwards formula
in Cianci v. New Times Publishing Co., 639 F.2d 54, 68-69 & n.17 (2d Cir. 1980). But c Comment,
Restricting the First Amendment Right to Republish Defamatory Statements, supra note 61, at 1501-
07 (criticizing Cianci's reading of Edwards).
A rationale that might give the newsworthiness standard some meaning could be based on the dual
functions of attribution. An attribution may lend credence to newsworthy information, or it may be
newsworthy itself. See supra pp. 88-89, 97. If the newsworthiness standard is meant to protect only
publications falling into the latter category, it is conceptually defensible. But from a practical point of
view, such a distinction would be difficult to draw, and the resulting ambiguity might discourage
publishers, uncertain as to how a particular attributed statement would be labeled, from publishing it.
Cf New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (acknowledging strategic concerns in
protection of speech); BeVier, The First Amendment and Political Speech: An Inquiry Into the Sub-
stance and Limits of Principle, 30 STAN. L. REV. 299, 347-52 (1978) (applying theory of strategic
protection of speech to Supreme Court's defamation decisions).
Several courts that have followed or discussed Edwards have recognized newsworthiness and accu-
racy as the only limitations on the privilege. See, e.g., Whitaker v. Denver Post, Inc., 4 Media L.
Rep. (BNA) 1351 (D. Wyo. 1978); Hatjioannou v. Tribune Co., 8 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 2637 (Fla.
Cir. Ct. 1982); Smith v. Taylor County Publishing Co., 8 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 1294 (Fla. Cir. Ct.
1982), appeal docketed, No. AN103 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. June 28, 1982); Krauss v. Champaign
News Gazette, Inc., 59 I1. App. 3d 745, 375 N.E.2d 1362 (1978); Campo Lindo for Dogs, Inc. v.
New York Post Corp., 65 A.D.2d 650, 409 N.Y.S.2d 453 (1978); Orr v. Lynch, 60 A.D.2d 949, 401
N.Y.S.2d 897, afl'd, 45 N.Y.2d 903, 383 N.E.2d 562, 411 N.Y.S.2d 10 (1978); Belton v. Braham, 6
Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1787 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980). Several courts that have rejected the contention
that the Edwards rule is constitutionally mandated have done so on the grounds that a standard based
on newsworthiness is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Gertz overturning the Rosen-
bloom newsworthiness test. See, e.g., Dickey v. CBS, 583 F.2d 1221, 1225-26 & n.5 (3d Cir. 1978)
(Edwards inconsistent with Gertz and St. Amant); Newell v. Field Enterprises, Inc., 91 111. App. 3d
735, 757, 415 N.E.2d 434, 451-52 (1980); McCall v. Courier-Journal & Louisville Times Co., 623
S.W.2d 882, 886 (Ky. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2239 (1982); Hogan v. Herald Co., 84 A.D.2d
470, 478, 446 N.Y.S.2d 836, 842, afld, 58 N.Y.2d 630, 444 N.E.2d 1002, 458 N.Y.S.2d 538 (1982);
see also Sowle, supra note 50, at 532 (privilege of republication covering statements "of legitimate
public concern" inconsistent with Gertz). While Gertz is not entirely on point, since the constitutional
value of republished speech differs from that of original speech, see note 65, a neutral reporting
privilege that protects the republication of any newsworthy statement would fall far beyond the bal-
ance set out in Gertz between protected speech and reputation. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418
U.S. 323, 346 (1974) (newsworthiness standard provides too little protection to private individuals
and is ill-suited for judicial application). This conclusion cannot be as easily drawn, however, if the
privilege is further limited by other standards.
68. Some courts have dropped the public-private plaintiff distinction while retaining the other
elements of the Edwards test, particularly the requirement that the defamatory statement be made by
a responsible, prominent speaker. See Bair v. Palm Beach Newspapers, Inc., 8 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA)
2028 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1982), appeal docketed, No. 82-1362 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. June 29, 1982); Village
of Grafton v. American Broadcasting Co., 70 Ohio App. 2d 205, 435 N.E.2d 1131 (1980). While it is
true that the public has a great interest in knowing about defamatory statements made by prominent
speakers, even if they are directed against private individuals, this approach squarely contradicts the
holding in Gertz.
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competing interests of speech and compensation for injury. Equally signif-
icant is the requirement in Edwards that the report be "disinterested."
The opinion placed great emphasis on the fact that the defendant newspa-
per had included exculpatory information in its news story-denials by
the defamed parties of the charge against them. 9 This requirement of
evenhandedness is important in two respects. By mitigating the damage
done by the publication of a false statement, it moves the balance back
toward the protection of reputation. In addition, it captures for the reader
the value of false attributed speech by alerting him that such speech may
be false.
B. Evenhandedness and Protecting Reports of Rumor
By limiting its protection to statements by responsible and prominent
speakers, Edwards failed to assist the publisher of rumor, since by defini-
tion a rumor lacks a definite source, much less a prominent or responsible
one. 7  But as it is currently designed, the Edwards test would be ill-suited
to apply in cases in which the attribution takes an unorthodox form such
as rumor. The Edwards requirement for the inclusion of exculpatory in-
formation is minimal; as described in Edwards, it seems to apply only to
exculpatory information in the reporter's possession.71 The court rejected
the suggestion that the publisher investigate the veracity of a speaker's
statement: "Nor must the press take up cudgels against dubious charges in
order to publish them without fear of liability for defamation. 7 2 It could
be argued that if a publisher knew that the statement of a prominent,
responsible speaker was false, the publisher should be obligated to investi-
gate the statement further. But knowledge of falsity is rarely absolute, and
so the court was probably justified in allowing some leeway for reliance
69. Edwards, 556 F.2d at 120.
70. Cf. Comment, Constitutional Privilege to Republish Defamation, supra note 61, at 1276-77
(irresponsible and little-known speakers can play roles in newsworthy events as important as roles
played by responsible and prominent speakers). But cf Note, supra note 61, at 637 (rejecting privilege
protecting republication of any statement as creating unacceptable risk of abuse).
71. See Weingarten v. Block, 102 Cal. App. 3d 129, 148, 162 Cal. Rptr. 701, 714 (1980) ("Even
an author whose function is to gather facts need not necessarily verify his information."), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 899 (1980); Krauss v. Champaign News Gazette, Inc., 59 I1. App. 3d 745, 747, 375 N.E.2d
1362, 1363 (1978) (under doctrine of neutral reporting, journalist "need inquire no further"); Com-
ment, Constitutional Privilege to Republish Defamation, supra note 61, at 1281 (Edwards does not
require strict editorial balance but may require publisher to mention information in possession contra-
dicting published statement).
In Cianci v. New Times Publishing Co., 639 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1980), the court seemed to read a
more stringent requirement of evenhandedness into Edwards. Yet the focus of the court's concern still
was on exculpatory information within the publisher's possession rather than on a need to conduct
further investigation. Id. at 62; see also Comment, Restricting the First Amendment Right to Repub-
lish Defamatory Statements, supra note 61, at 1503-06 (discussing Cianci's treatment of requirement
of evenhandedness).
72. Edwards, 556 F.2d at 120.
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on the speaker's status.
In contrast, a rumor, by its very nature, should raise doubts in the pub-
lisher's mind about its veracity. Since rumor is known to have an uncer-
tain factual basis, a republication privilege could reasonably require the
publisher to "take up cudgels" against such speech through further inves-
tigation while adopting a more lenient view toward statements by promi-
nent speakers. Furthermore, in cases typified by Edwards, the defamed
may still have recourse against the original speaker if the privilege is in-
voked." But if the defamatory statement is attributed to rumor, the plain-
tiff must sue the publisher or no one at all. Therefore, the defamed
party's interest in protecting his reputation also dictates that a higher
standard of evenhandedness be imposed on the publisher of rumor.
This discussion suggests that a comprehensive republication privilege
should contain a requirement of evenhandedness that varies according to
the type of attribution, with a stronger requirement applied to unreliable
sources such as rumor. A republication standard could achieve this result
by tying the requirement of evenhandedness to the "knowing falsity" re-
quirement of the current actual malice test. 4 Under such a proposal, the
publisher would be required to communicate any knowledge of falsity he
has acquired concerning the attributed information." His knowledge of
falsity would be measured according to the actual malice standard, that is,
according to whether the publisher knew the statement was false or acted
with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.76 One factor in
73. Cf Edwards, 556 F.2d at 119 (suit filed against source of allegedly defamatory statements and
newspaper); Catalano v. Pechous, 83 Ill. 2d 146, 419 N.E.2d 350 (1980) (plaintiff granted summary
judgment against originator of statement; publisher protected from suit by lack of actual malice), cert.
denied, 451 U.S. 911 (1981).
74. Obviously, if the publisher were not found to have knowledge of falsity, he would not be liable
under the Sullivan-Gertz line of cases and would not need the protection of the proposed privilege.
Therefore, it makes sense for the republication privilege to incorporate the actual malice standard.
75. The method of communicating falsity under the proposed standard would be left to the re-
porter's discretion. Among the alternatives available to him would be printing the information that
contradicts the statement, reporting the unreliability of the sources, or allowing the defamed party to
respond.
An objection to this requirement of evenhandedness may be that it is analogous to imposing a "right
of reply" on a newspaper in contravention of Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241
(1974). In Tornillo, the Court struck down a Florida statute that required a newspaper to grant a
political candidate a "right of reply" if the newspaper published defamatory material about the candi-
date. The Court disapproved of this effort to instruct a newspaper on what to print, reasoning that
such instructions were only slightly removed from censorship. While the proposed republication stan-
dard does not require that a newspaper publish material presenting the defamed party's side, a stan-
dard that hinges what could be substantial liability on whether the report is balanced may seem
different only in form. Yet Tornillo is distinguishable. Tornillo involved a statute that created a "right
of reply" based on any defamatory publication. Under the proposed privilege, a publisher would be
required to print additional information only when he knows his publication is false; without the
exculpatory information, the publication is of no value to the reader and should be discouraged.
76. The actual malice test-a scienter requirement based on the state of mind of the pub-
lisher-requires proof of subjective awareness. This test has been criticized for raising difficult eviden-
tiary problems, see Robertson, supra note 59, at 238, and for encouraging discovery which interferes
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detemining reckless disregard is the trustworthiness of the source. The less
reliable the source, the greater is the likelihood that the reporter will be
found to have knowledge of falsity-in some cases, owing merely to the
source itself." Consequently, the reporter citing unreliable sources would
be more likely to be found to have knowledge of falsity and therefore
would have a greater incentive to investigate further and to include excul-
patory information in order to retain his privilege.
In illustration, consider the prominent, responsible speaker and rumor.
There is nothing about the responsible and prominent speaker as a source
that would put the publisher on notice that his statement is false. Thus,
the publisher would not be obligated to conduct his own research into the
statement's veracity in order to retain the privilege. But if information
came to the publisher's attention suggesting that the statement was false,
he would then be obligated to include that information in his news story.
This result is identical to that achieved under the Edwards privilege. In
contrast, the publisher who prints a story based on rumor and does noth-
ing more than attribute the story to rumor would lose the proposed privi-
lege. Knowledge of falsity would be assumed from the nature of the source
itself; to retain the privilege, the publisher must investigate the rumor and
report the results of that investigation.7 1 In this case, the proposed stan-
dard is much stronger than Edwards.
After investigating the information provided by an unorthodox source,
the publisher still must communicate clearly what his research has uncov-
ered.79 If the publisher finds no information that contradicts his source, he
in the editorial process, see Oakes, Proof of Actual Malice in Defamation Actions: An Unsolved
Dilemma, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 655 (1979). In most circumstances, these same problems would arise
under the proposed standard. But in cases in which the falsity of the statement is acknowledged in the
publication, the reporter's state of mind would already have been revealed, and the proposed standard
would require only that the publication be compared with the body of facts from which the reporter
wrote the story.
77. See supra p. 95.
78. The proposed standard should have little impact on the work habits of the vast majority of
journalists; the evenhandedness that the standard requires is less stringent than the level of fairness
most reporters seek as a matter of professional pride. In some cases, however, it may result in more
thoroughly reseirched stories, since it will lessen the incentives created by the current actual malice
test not to investigate defamatory material thoroughly. See St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731
(1968) (actual malice test "encourages the irresponsible publisher not to inquire"); Robertson, supra
note 59, at 240 ("The logic of St. Amant is, the less a publisher knows about the subject of an article,
the better."). The incentive exists because of the scienter requirement of actual malice; if the reporter
does not investigate further, he will not discover that what he has learned is false. Under the proposed
standard, the reporter, upon discovering information that contradicts the statement he plans to repub-
lish, need only include that information in his story to avoid liability. There is no incentive not to
investigate further.
79. Efforts to communicate falsity should not be judged too strictly. Just as a plaintiff must prove
knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard with convincing clarity, he should also be required to show a
wide divergence between the reporter's knowledge of falsity and the evidence of falsity included in the
story before liability is found.
For example, the proposed standard would take into account the difference between a reporter who
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can satisfy the proposed standard by describing in the story the source and
its unreliable character. For example, in Burns v. Times Argus Associa-
tion,80 the defendant newspaper published an article describing an anony-
mous allegation made against the wife of a public official and gubernato-
rial candidate. In its story, the newspaper revealed that the allegation had
been made anonymously and noted that the allegation could be part of a
campaign to discredit the plaintiff's husband in his election bid.81 This
would constitute a description sufficient to retain the proposed privilege.
But reporting the source's unreliability would not be sufficient if the pub-
lisher had other information that established the statement's falsity. For
example, the Washington Post did not believe the rumor that President
Carter had bugged Blair House. Although its report of the story was la-
beled a rumor, that label alone, while putting the reader on notice that he
should read the item with some skepticism, left open the possibility that
the item was true. Under the proposed standard, the Post would not be
found to have communicated adequately its knowledge of falsity.82
Conclusion
Absent legal considerations, a journalist will use rumor and other unor-
thodox sources only when the newsworthiness of the information they
provide outweighs the problems that the use of such sources creates. The
legal standards of liability under current libel law, however, do not recog-
nize that valuable information may be gained from these sources and
therefore restrain their use excessively. The proposed standard would al-
low greater use of reports based on rumor but would require the printing
has rebuttal evidence on hand and a reporter who has to dig for such evidence under deadline pres-
sure. While the reporter facing a deadline may suspect the veracity of a statement, he may not be able
to reach the defamed party for comment until the deadline has passed. In such cases, the court should
look to see if the exculpatory information was printed in a timely manner (such as the next day's
newspaper), rather than requiring it to be printed in the same story as the defamatory statement.
80. 139 Vt. 381, 430 A.2d 773 (1981).
81. Id. at 383, 430 A.2d at 774. The Vermont Supreme Court found that the story was published
without actual malice and therefore upheld the granting of the newspaper's motion for summary
judgment. Id. at 389-90, 430 A.2d at 777-78. The court's finding was questionable, given the treat-
ment of anonymous sources under current actual malice doctrine. See supra p. 95. The court also cited
Edwards to support its holding, id., although a story based on an anonymous source would fall outside
the Edwards standard. Cf. Paquette v. Vanguard Publishing Co., 8 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 2243 (Vt.
Super. Ct. 1982) (extending privilege to news stories based on confidential sources).
82. A reporter who attributes statements to a confidential source would not be able to claim pro-
tection under the proposed standard. The demands of confidentiality prevent the reporter from pub-
lishing the full context of the attributed statement, lest he reveal his source's identity. Consequently,
the reader cannot independently evaluate the statement's value; he must rely on the reporter's evalua-
tion of the statement as revealed by the reporter's decision to publish it. Therefore, the reporter should
be viewed as assuming responsibility for the statement and should be held liable for knowledge of the
underying truth or falsity of the statement. But see Paquette v. Vanguard Publishing Co., 8 MEDIA L.
REP. (BNA) 2243 (Vt. Super. Ct. 1982) (applying neutral reporting privilege to news story based on
confidential sources).
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of exculpatory information known to the reporter, both to enhance the
value of such reports to the reader and to minimize their damage to
reputation.
